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Abstract 
In this thesis the role of the European Parliament has been explored and analysed. 
Four scenarios for European Integration⎯Europe of States, United States of 
Europe, Europe of Regions and Europe of Networks⎯developed by Jönsson et al, 
have been employed as a framework for the analysis. To examine the principle 
role of the EP in each scenario, in addition to the varying possibilities and 
challenges each democratic scenario poses, Christopher Lord’s model of Audit 
Democracy, as well as Oddvar Eriksen and Erik Fossum’s deliberative models for 
democracy, have been employed. The role of the EP as a representative institution 
is challenged in Europe of Networks and Europe of States. In the United States of 
Europe, the EP has the role of a federal parliament. The EP’s status in Europe of 
Regions depends on whether the regions will replicate the representative 
institutions of nation states or if new forms of organisation will develop.  
All the scenarios are found to face difficulties in meeting the democratic models’ 
requirements. Different forms of identity are a key aspect of the models’ 
feasibility. A general difficulty is how to combine territorial and non-territorial 
forms of organisation. 
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 1 Introduction 
Whilst interning at the European Parliament, questions about the nature of the 
parliament often arose amid daily work. What are the principle relations between 
the European Parliament and national parliaments? Who do the parliamentarians 
in the EP represent?  The more I thought about it, I realised there are no clear 
answers to these questions, among either politicians or students of European 
Integration. My ambition with this thesis is to explore the role of the European 
Parliament in relation to national parliaments, and different ways of thinking 
regarding parliamentary representation in the European Union.  
1.1 Why Study Democracy in an EU Context? 
The European Parliament has been said to be the institution: “most commonly and 
most interestingly associated with the EU’s democracy problem” (Warleigh 2003, 
p. 77). The question of what role the European Parliament ought to have is 
intrinsically connected to the institutional democratic design of the European 
Union. Before discussing the role of the EP, some notes regarding democracy in 
the EU will therefore be outlined.  
Contemporary observers of European integration have far from reached a 
consensus either if the EU in its internal decision-making can and ought to be 
democratic, or that the current institutional design is suffering from ‘democratic 
deficit’. Even if one tends to agree in both cases, this does not clarify what kind of 
democratic institutions are desirable. Why then should it matter if the EU is 
democratic? First and foremost, its embrace of democracy is stated in its charter 
(Art 6.1 TEU; more recently expressed in article 1:a of the Lisbon Treaty). I also 
wholeheartedly agree with Mitrany that all public action is political, and from this 
it follows that all public action (including in the EU) should be democratic 
(Warleigh 2003, p. 127).  
There are, however, other positions on the question of democracy in the EU, 
some of which I will briefly describe here. Giandomenico Majone is one of the 
supporters of the no ‘Democratic deficit thesis’ (1998). He argues economic 
integration does not necessarily have to lead political integration, and standards of 
legitimacy derived from parliamentary democracies are therefore not applicable in 
an EU context. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives 
oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic 
integration one cannot expect parliamentary practise to work within the EU. On 
the contrary, he argues the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ is democratically 
justified (Majone 1998, p. 7).  
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 European Integration has, however, evolved beyond solely economic 
cooperation (Beetham and Lord 2001), and arguments that strict 
intergovernmental cooperation or developing a European federation, are the only 
options is questionable (c.f the view of Eriksen and Fossum 2008, p. 8). In the 
European White Paper on Governance the Commission draws the following 
conclusion: 
 
The Union is changing as well. Its agenda extends to foreign policy and 
defence, migration and the fight against crime. It is expanding to include new 
members. It will no longer be judged solely by its ability to remove barriers 
to trade or to complete an internal market; its legitimacy today depends on 
involvement and participation (2001, p. 11).  
  
Another argument in line with Majone’s is that non-democratic structures can 
operate within a framework laid down by democratic ones (Lord 2004a, p. 16). 
This would however require that the EU is within the ultimate controlling power 
of the Member States that comprise, which is questionable. 
 
In sum, the integration process has itself changed national democracies and 
the ultimate rule-making authority of Member States in ways that render 
those things unavailable for the indirect legitimation of Union power. The 
claim that only bodies that cannot be controlled by democracies are in need 
of independent democratic legitimation is no longer an alibi for a democratic 
EU. It is now an argument for it.  (Beetham and Lord 2001, p. 449) 
 
 A third, more general, indirect argument is that the EU is a state in the making 
and that its creation been more democratic than that of most Member States (Lord 
2004a, p 76; Manin 1997). In the case of the EU, polity came before democracy, 
in contrast to national states, where the state was established first, followed by the 
development of democratic procedures. Given Mitrany’s statement that all public 
action should be democratic the argument of ‘developing democracy’ fail.  
The reason that the European Parliament is the institution most associated with 
democracy in the EU is probably because the Parliamentary model is a classic 
component to democracy, as we know it. Direct European elections, however, has 
failed to make a significant public impact, and little consideration has been given 
from national governments to issues such as how links should be made between 
national and European parliament (Warleigh 2003, p.85). Is the EU “the most 
visible example of post-parliamentary governance” (Andersen and Burns in 
Warleigh 2003, p. 2), or are we perhaps witnessing a ‘reparliamentarisation’ of 
European politics (Blichner 2000, p. 142)? 
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 1.2 Outline of the Study and Delimitation 
Students of the EU today tend to agree that the Union represents a political order 
that is neither an intergovernmental organisation nor a supranational state, a 
political form that seems to be: “hard to catch within available theoretical nets” 
(Jönsson et al 2000, p. 126). Some reasons for this are their fluidity and 
complexity, as well as the constant transformations that are characteristic of 
European Integration (ibid). An important aspect is the tension between territorial 
and non-territorial forms of organisation, which is inherent in the European 
project. On the one hand, the EU is a union between national states, whilst on the 
other, policy making within the union is, to a high degree, organised around 
networks that include actors other than the official representatives of the Member 
States (Jönsson et al 2007, p.  247).  
Given the above-described characteristics, and the fact that there is no simple 
definition of what the EU is; what can be said about the democratic features of the 
EU? How can one avoid “getting stuck” in having to define what kind of entity 
the EU really is before any conclusions can be drawn about the democratic design 
of the union? Connected to this problem is the fact that any proposed democratic 
design has to have a reasonable chance of success in a European context; as 
Weale puts it: “any ‘non-utopian’ normative theory is committed to the position 
that ‘ought implies can’” (cited in Lord 2004a, p. 7).  
To avoid this problem, four scenarios will be used as a framework for my 
analysis. The scenarios represent four possible lines of development for Europe, 
as worked out by Jönsson et al (2007). Although they are not about democracy 
per se, each scenario has implications for the ability to pursue democracy in 
Europe. Originally, they were a part of a macro trend analysis of European 
Integration, however, in my thesis they will be employed as a conceptual tool to 
formulate clear-cut alternatives as a base for the analysis.  
I will then use two different models of democracy, based on a representative 
and deliberative ideal respectively, to analyse what possibilities and challenges 
with regard to democracy each scenario poses. The thesis design will help me to 
analyse the principal relations between national parliaments and the EP in each 
scenario, and to on the basis of the democratic models chosen, what democratic 
challenges each scenario poses for representation in the EU. 
Some of the scenarios can be combined, which probably is the most likely 
development. For the purpose of delimitation, such combinations will not be 
covered in this thesis. 
A possible objection to the thesis design is whether it is relevant to study only 
one of the EU institutions (the EP), since the institutions can be said to 
complement each other and, combined constitute a legitimate political system. 
With the growing influence of the EP, its defined competences and the thesis’s 
focus on parliamentary assemblies in European Integration I would argue that the 
problems of studying the EP in its own right does not provide a major obstacle (c.f 
Lord 2004a, p. 4). 
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 Dryzek presents some important criticism of the analytical usefulness and 
constructions of normative models for democracy. In his view, thinking in terms 
of models of democracy is often less productive than doing so in terms of 
processes of democratisation. He argues that democracy is an essentially 
contested concept, and that this does not only result in competing models vying 
for our attention, but that contestation over defining democracy is central to the 
concept itself.  
 
The process of democratization requires space for this contestation, and for 
the democratization path to be affected by it. The search for improving the 
democratic qualities of any polity is always context-specific – and particular 
models may or may not be capable of providing useful insights in specific 
contexts. Democracy is actually an open-ended project that should not be 
thought of as converging on any single model (Dryzek 2007, p. 47) 
 
The argument above has some merit, in the sense that it is important to separate 
the idea of democracy from its practise, so as not to mistake the approximation of 
democracy with democracy itself. As Eriksen and Fossum states, any institutional 
arrangement is at best an approximation to the ideal of procedural democracy 
(2007, pp. 6-7). If we are to say anything about democracy, some notions are 
needed, and models can be valuable tools for providing coherent, non-conflicting 
conceptualisations of democracy, used to evaluate empirical practises.  
An important question for the design of the study was how to select 
representatives for each democratic theory.  The central concern was to pick 
representatives who had elaborated in detail on the issue, but at the same time was 
broad enough to represent the central ideas for each democratic model. As a 
result, the deliberative theories of Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum as 
well as Christopher Lord’s representative model for ‘audit democracy’, have been 
chosen. Lord’s model has traits of consociational democracy developed by Arend 
Lijphart, in an attempt to make a representative model fit the multinational EU 
context. Eriksen and Fossum have written extensively on both democracy in the 
EU and democratic deficit. In their working paper they construct three models for 
European Integration as a means to regain democratic legitimacy, these will be 
integrated I my approach. To avoid confusion, these will be referred to as sub-
models, to distinguish the overarching model. 
Using their models inside a larger framework constituted by the scenarios 
provides the possibility of making comparisons with other democratic model. In 
this case Lord’s model based on a representative democratic ideal give an 
interesting contrast to Eriksen and Fossum’s deliberative model.  
Since my interest lies in one specific case, namely the European Parliament, 
the issue of how to select cases is irrelevant.  I do, however, agree with Lord that 
the EU is a good case for studying how we think about democracy in a 
contemporary international setting (2004, p. 2) and that this also gives rise to 
interesting questions about democracy beyond the (nation-) state. Studies on 
democracy in EU might, therefore, provide insights for other topics of research, 
but since it possesses some unique traits in comparison to other examples of 
regional integration (where EU is the only case where democracy on 
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 supranational level is pursued) I deem the level of direct generalisability to be 
low.  
1.3 Research Questions 
Guided by the democratic models, the aim of the thesis is to answer the following 
questions: 
 
• What is the principal relation between the EP and national parliaments (or 
equivalent institutions) in each scenario? 
 
• What are the challenges and possibilities for the EP as a representative 
institution? What challenges do the four scenarios pose in relation to 
models of representative and deliberative democracy? 
1.4 Methodological Considerations 
1.4.1 Normative Method 
The aim of a normative study is to analyse, problematise and shed light on 
assertions regarding values. It can also include scrutiny of the justifications for 
positions on political matters (for example ‘should one obey the law’).  In this 
thesis, four scenarios will be analysed in relation to two democratic models, in 
order to investigate what implications each model has (Badersten 2006, p. 7).  
The distinction between normative and empirical, fact and value has been a 
matter of extensive debate in the history of Philosophy as well as that of Social 
Science (c.f Badersten 2006, p. 38; Meehan 1971, p. 142). The following analysis 
is normative the sense that it investigates scenarios in regard to normative models 
of democracy. The ambition is, however, neither to discuss the normative 
foundations of the models, nor pass any judgements on which theory is better. I 
will instead, in a neutral manner, analyse the implications for each scenario. 
Therefore the study is normative in the sense that I am analysing values and 
passing judgements on how each model fits with the scenarios discussed. 
Naturally, this design involves a certain element of interpretation. It is my reading 
and understanding of the democratic theories, however, with an aim of 
intersubjectivity. This means that I will try to avoid hidden assumptions and 
attempt as explicitly as possible to clarify how I reach my conclusions (Lundquist 
1993, p. 52; Badersten 2006, pp. 74-78). The design I have chosen will, as in most 
normative studies, result in high demands on clarity and consistency. I would 
argue, however, that these demands are not fundamentally different to the ones 
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 that are the required for a more empirical analysis, for example: when it comes to 
precision in concepts used (Meehan 1971).  
According to Lord, evaluation (normative judgements) has sometimes been 
avoided for fear of confusing facts and values and reaching conclusions which is 
no more than the subjective opinion of the researcher (2004, p. 8). The latter has 
already been discussed; the former – inferring values from facts or vice versa – is 
a mistake that should to be avoided. The notion that normative statements cannot 
follow from facts is sometimes referred to as Hume’s law and is central to 
normative studies -if the distinction is not upheld logically, the meaning of any 
normative statement is lost (see Badersten 2006, pp. 56-71 for a further 
discussion). 
To conclude, values studied in a normative analysis must have intersubjective 
validity- shared meanings outside of the evaluating evaluated subject. Given the 
ontological and epistemological position, one can view values in different ways. 
The basic stipulation for my study is the existence of values, at least in the sense 
that they exert influence on human action modes of thought, as well as be put 
under scientific scrutiny (Badersten 2006, s. 69).  
1.4.2 Scenario Analysis 
The scenarios forming the framework for my analysis are taken from Europa Quo 
Vadis?, a multidisciplinary work by a political scientist, a historian and a 
geographer, exploring four different ways of  organising European space1 
Regarding the methodology in constructing scenarios Jönsson et al state the 
following: 
 
Predictions about the future, depicted in the form of a scenario are not 
scientific in the strict positivist sense; they cannot be empirically proven, 
verified or falsified and the validity can only be judged in retrospect. Even 
though the basis for testing is not present at the moment when the research is 
conducted, it should be put under the same scrutiny as other social research. 
Criteria such as theoretical consistency, relevance for the given topic, validity 
and sufficient material for the formulation of hypotheses are as relevant for 
future studies as for social science in general. (Jönsson et al, 2007, p. 181) 
 
The reasoning behind historical method is that in order to understand and evaluate 
alternative futures, contextual knowledge regarding historical crossroads and 
previously existing alternatives from different periods is necessary.  
 
The historical perspective is also essential to a better understanding of the 
way humans have organized their existence in time and space, how and 
where their loyalties have been established, and how they built their 
communities (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 166).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 For the same topic in English, Organizing European Space 
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 The intention for the scenarios presented in my analysis is not to predict the future 
to explain European Integration, or draw conclusions on the probability of each 
scenario. It is, however to, in combination with the democratic models, provide an 
analytical tool to “map out” different possible roles for the European Parliament 
and its relations to national parliaments. 
1.5 Earlier Research – European Integration, the EP 
and National Parliaments 
1.5.1 National Parliaments in European Integration 
The literature on national parliaments and their role in European Integration is 
generally empirically oriented (for example Bergman and Damgaard 2000, 
Corbett 1998, Hegeland 2006, Katz and Wessels 1999). The focus has often been 
on examining if, and how, the influence of the national parliaments has changed 
with developments in European Integration. A common notion in the literature is 
that national parliaments are “victims of European Integration”, losing influence 
as a result of the process (Raunio 2007, p. 158; Gabel 2002). Little theoretical 
consideration has been given to the principal relation between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments, since focus is often on the national 
parliaments’ role of scrutinising the actions of national governments (sometimes 
by employing a principal-agent approach).  
In Member States, the role of national assemblies varies, due to the political 
system of each state.  In regard to the position the national parliament has in 
influencing national EU policies, EU Member States can roughly be divided into 
three categories. Parliaments in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and to some 
extent the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands have strong positions. 
National parliaments in France, Belgium and Luxembourg have some influence, 
while parliaments in southern Europe and Ireland lack the mechanisms to play 
role in the respective EU-policies (Hegeland 2006, p. 18).  
COSAC (a co-operation between committees of national parliaments that deal 
with European affairs and representatives from the EP) states: that of the 27 
Member States of the European Union, 14 have a unicameral parliament and 13 a 
bicameral parliament. Due to this mixture of unicameral and bicameral systems, 
there are 40 national parliamentary chambers among the 27 EU Member States 
(COSAC 2009). 
1.5.2 Basic functions of the EP 
The parliament today lacks one most central function– namely control of the 
executive power.  It does, however, have other areas of influence. In Burns’ list 
the EP has five main formal powers as follows: 
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• First, the EP has the ability to amend legislation- a power that can be 
extensively used if the legal base of the legislation in question so 
permits. 
• Second, the EP shares the Council’s responsibility as the EU’s 
budgetary authority. 
• Third, the EP has certain powers of scrutiny over the Commission, 
including the right to grant discharge of the Union budget, the right to 
convene Committees of Inquiry into alleged maladministration in the 
implementation of EC law, and the right to ask questions to the 
Council and the Commission. 
• Fourth, the EP has powers of appointment over other EU bodies such 
as the Ombudsman’s position and increasingly in the Commission. 
• Fifth, the EP has the ability to dismiss the Commission as a whole 
(although it cannot dismiss individual Commissioners). 
(Burns cited in Warleigh 2003 p. 79) 
1.5.3 Relation between the EP and National Parliaments 
Lord presents three principal views regarding the relations between the EP and 
national parliaments. The first is that the controlling roles of the EP and national 
parliaments are both additive and complementary. These bodies should 
collaborate and divide their labours, in order to maximise the total quantum of 
parliamentary control in the European arena. One notion of a desirable division of 
labour is that the EP should scrutinise the Council as a collective, decision-
making body whilst national parliaments should concentrate all their energies on 
holding their governments to account for their individual contributions. Another 
division of labour is that national parliaments should focus on matters where the 
Council decides by unanimity (Treaty Change, CFSP, and Justice and Home 
Affairs) and the EP on those areas where it decides by majority (Lord 2004a, p. 
166). 
 A second view, is that national parliaments have delegated powers to the 
overall complex of Union institutions, all of which they need to monitor all of 
these if they are to ensure no-one oversteps the terms of their agency. They may 
even be especially watchful of the EP, given its history as an “energetic ‘agency-
shaper’ and enthusiast for supranational solutions”(Lord 2004a, p. 167). 
Lastly, the concept of labour division can also be criticised from the point of 
view of the EP. If the EP is the ‘parliament of the European Union’, it has 
responsibility to scrutinise all three pillars, given that any meaningful public 
control may need to include the external effects of decisions taken under one 
pillar on the other two (Lord 2004a, p. 167). 
The European Parliament has released a number of reports about relations to 
national parliaments (1997, 2002 and in 2009 a report on the relation between the 
EP and national parliaments under the Lisbon Treaty was released). The general 
view expressed in the reports, is an increased influence of both, the EP and 
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 national parliaments, as a way to increase parliamentary control and reduce the 
democratic deficit. 
A 1997 report equalised the democratic deficit with areas where the EP has 
little influence, and thus implicitly concludes that the EP is the institution that 
ought to transform the deficit (EP 1997, p. 5). In a 2002 report from the European 
Parliament on the relations with the national parliaments it is stated: “the 
European Parliament does not see itself as the exclusive representative of the 
citizens and guarantor of democracy in relations with the other Union institutions; 
it does not concern itself exclusively with acquiring greater powers, ignoring 
recognition of the role of the national parliaments” (p. 6). 
It is also stated that parliamentarisation is necessary in the EU and must rely 
on two fundamental approaches involving the broadening of the European 
Parliament’s powers vis-à-vis all the Union’s institutions but also the 
strengthening of national parliaments’ powers vis-à-vis their respective 
governments. The primary task and function of the EP and the national 
parliaments, is to take part in legislative decision-making and scrutinise political 
choices at both the national European levels respectively. 
Regarding the current relations with national parliaments it is stated that it 
have developed fairly positively in recent years, but not yet to a sufficient extent. 
A number of positive measures is mentioned including: Joint parliamentary 
Meetings on horizontal topics going beyond the competence of one committee, 
regular Joint Committee Meetings at least twice per semester, inter-parliamentary 
meetings at the level of committee chairs, visits by members of national 
parliaments to the EP in order to take part in meetings of corresponding 
specialised committees and meetings within the political groups or parties at a 
European level, bringing together politicians from all Member States with 
Members of the European Parliament (EP 2002). 
Future relations between the EP and national parliaments are also touched 
upon. It is stated that innovations at the level of national parliaments should be 
developed. This could include granting Members of the EP the right to be invited 
once a year to speak in plenary sittings of national parliaments, to participate in 
meetings of European affairs committees on a consultative basis, to take part in 
meetings of specialised committees whenever they discuss relevant pieces of EU 
legislation, or to take part in meetings of respective political groups on a 
consultative basis.  The future political role of COSAC will have to be defined by 
close cooperation between the European Parliament and the national parliaments: 
 
Relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments 
must take the form of cooperation, which is more structured, but not 
necessarily more formalised. [..]Interparliamentary cooperation must not 
encroach on parliaments' decision-making powers. Any form of 
interparliamentary cooperation should be deliberative by nature, non-decisive 
with regard to the existing EU policy cycles and characterised by mutual 
recognition of parliaments and parliamentarians as mirrors of society (EP 
2002. p. 12) 
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 2 Four Scenarios for European 
Integration 
Scenario technique is employed, on the basis of empirical observations and 
theories of social science, to choose and isolate certain trends or developments 
(Jönsson et al 2007 pp. 177-180). Jönsson et al discuss European Integration and 
the organisation of European space in a historical perspective, and from this 
discussion depict four lines of development for the EU, each with its own logic:  
 
• Europe of States 
• United States of Europe 
• Europe of Regions 
• Europe of Networks 
 
The first three are territorial to their nature and the last organisational. Sovereign 
states are caught between supranational integration, autonomous networks and 
self-aware regions. The tension among them becomes apparent in contemporary 
discussions about the foundations of political power, democracy and legitimate 
normative systems. The trend of regionalisation coincides with globalisation, as 
they seemingly reinforce each other (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 141). Each scenarios 
relation to globalisation and regionalisation is illustrated in figure 1. 
2.1 Europe of States 
The modern national state has its origin in 17th Europe. It then spread throughout 
the world to became the dominant form of political organisation. Guided by the 
concept of sovereignty, Jönsson et al present an understanding of a state as:  
 
• (a) an organisation with far reaching authority claims but with 
varying control; 
• (b) situated at the international/national vortex with ‘dual 
anchorage’ enabling it to exercise power both domestically and 
internationally; 
• (c) an entity whose control is based primarily on coercion and 
economic exchange, domestically (policing/taxation) as well as 
internationally (warfare/trade): 
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 • (d) an entity which has legal personality and is to be seen as an 
actor in its own right, and not merely a reflection of societal and 
economic interests” (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 80) 
 
The last two requirements are especially interesting since taxation as well as 
warfare is central functions of a state, where the EU has very small capabilities. 
The last stipulation defines a state as more than just a reflection of societal and 
economic interests and implies that if EU is to be viewed as actor close to a state, 
it needs to be more that just economic cooperation. During the early 19th century, 
ideas about representative democracy—as opposed to earlier notions of 
democracy where the citizens gathered in assemblies and public places—become 
the dominant source of legitimacy for nation-states (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 84).  
In a Europe of States, the EU functions as a traditional, multilateral 
organisation. The EU has retracted much of its influence, the level of 
supranational influence is minimal and the Member States’ governments are in 
control (Jönsson et al 2007, pp. 191-6). One of the driving factors and 
preconditions for this development is continued enlargement, which results, in 
more heterogeneous union where the Member States have less and less in 
common. The EU’s ability to agree on rules of decision-making will be minimal; 
both externally where the Member States will have their own foreign policies as 
well as internally, where for example the agricultural polices might be re-
nationalised (Jönsson et al 2008, pp. 191-4).  
Another precondition for this scenario is the attempts to develop a common 
European identity—a European demos—as well as attempts do establish 
democracy on a EU level have failed. The most important attempts to legitimise 
and develop democracy are taking place on national level (Jönsson et al 2008, p. 
195). 
2.2 United States of Europe 
This scenario implies the current Member States are transformed into units of a 
federation, with clearly defined competences and sets of powers in relation to the 
central (federal) government.  
The vision of a federal Europe, comparable to the USA is not new. The many 
languages and historically grounded national identities do, however, set Europe 
apart in comparison to the USA. According to Jönsson et al, the German federal 
model might therefore be better suited as a blue print for a future European 
federation. Already today the EU and Germany share many traits: a strong 
executive branch and a weaker parliament, shared competence between different 
levels and a culture of negotiation (Jönsson et al 2007, p. 196).  
Jönsson et al state a number of prerequisites for the development of a federal 
structure. Two of them are especially relevant for this analysis. The first, is the 
creation of a constitution where the relation between the Member States and the 
EU is explicitly stated. The second, is strong democratic support, as a necessary 
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 basis for a legitimate European federation. Direct election to the European 
parliament can be said to be the first step, but is in itself far from enough. The 
turnout is considerably lower than in national elections, which still can be said to 
be the European demos (Jönsson et al 2007, pp. 196-200).  
2.3 Europe of Regions 
Europe’s regions can be seen as the geographical building block of history. From 
throughout the Middle Ages to the 19th-century, descriptions of everyday life, 
trade and settlement were reflected in regional mosaic (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 
138). Today the concept of region can have a variety of meanings. A region is 
here defined as a unit smaller than an ordinary national state but larger than a 
municipality. In other words, it is an entity between the national and the local 
(Jönsson et al 2007, p. 105) 
In this scenario, the state has lost its leading role and the EU has neither an 
intergovernmental nor a supranational form of organisation. Instead, regions are 
the main unit of organisation. Whilst national capitals and Brussels are perceived 
as too far from the ‘people’, regions will fulfil the demand for engagement and 
inclusion (identity). A prerequisite for this scenario is, however, that the 
democratic crisis, in terms of decreasing turnout in national elections and 
engagement in national politics, in the national state and at the EU level is 
worsened. It will probably also demand strong leadership at regional level.  
Jönsson et al discuss different types of regions. In earlier periods, physical 
geography determined regional borders; waterways and roads united areas while 
mountains and forests separated. The regions of Italy and Spain and the Cantons 
of Switzerland are examples of physical-geographic regions. 
Ethnic and cultural regions often originate within the physical confines 
discussed earlier. Their endurance has, however, less to do with problems of 
transport than with phenomena associated with identity. According to Jönsson et 
al, identity is a dual concept consisting of external remoteness and internal 
community. It connotes remoteness and delimitation as well as commonality and 
community (2000. 139). Identity rests on linguistic, cultural and ethnic similarities 
and often includes a shared history and religion. Furthermore, identity bearing 
regions are the principal pillars of diversity in Europe. 
Functional regions are demarcated from the outside world in terms of travel, 
transportation contacts and other dependency relations that connect people and 
structures. This type of region is often described as centred, since it typically has 
an obvious core in the form of an urban centre, whose influence diminishes with 
distance. Regional borders thus become the interfaces between such fields of 
influence. The modern form of functional regions are often labelled as urban or 
city regions. Increasingly, however, cities in close proximity to each other are 
creating regions with multiple cores, where the largest are knows as conurbations 
(Jönsson et al 2000, p. 149). 
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 Administrative regions, are types of functional regions where a system of 
administrative regulations forms the basis for the division. Throughout Europe, 
they are used as territorial units for the collection of public statistics. Examples 
include the French départements and German Länder (ibid.) The different types of 
regions can of course also converge.  
According to Jönsson et al, historically, ethnic and cultural particularities 
usually evolved during the centuries within the shelter of physical barriers. 
Successive generations then created social, administrative, economic and political 
institutions to strengthen this cohesion. There are also cases of administrative 
divisions split physical regions, territorial identities and functional areas. It is in 
areas where administrative divisions, identity, contacts and patterns of daily 
movements coincide, that the best examples of homogenous, strong regions can 
be found (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 140).  
Even though regional independence has increased in much of Europe, the 
strength and independence of the regions differ strongly. France has 
approximately 36,000 municipalities and has been a centralised, unitary state 
since the French Revolution. In 1982, the country was divided into 20 regions, 
each with a directly elected council and an administration with a president. The 
authority of these, however, is low. Conversely, in Switzerland, there are more 
than 3,000 counties, each divided into twenty-six cantons with a high degree of 
autonomy. Each canton has full sovereignty in all matters not explicitly 
designated as the concern of the confederation in the Swiss constitution. A third 
example can be found in Spain. While officially a unitary state, Spain is 
composed of 17 regions with varying amounts of political independence. The 
historical regions of Catalonia, Andalusia, Galicia, the Basque Provinces and 
Navarre, have a strong sense of regional identity and greater autonomy than the 
other regions. Germany is a federation of 16 Bundesländer, each with its own 
constitution and legislative powers and a directly elected parliament who in turn 
appoints a government, headed by a president. Several countries, such as Sweden 
and Denmark, lack an existing regional tradition (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 144). 
In the EU and the in Council of Europe, several organs exist to promote the 
regions’ interests. The Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional 
authorities (CLRAE) was created in 1994 to allow regions and counties to 
participate in decision-making. In 1993, the EU’s Committee of the Regions was 
established, representing 200 local and regional organs. The members are 
nominated by state governments and formally appointed by the Council of 
Ministers. The Committee of Regions has a consultative rather than decision-
making function and advises the Council of Ministers and the Commission on 
matters of concern for the counties and regions. Other examples of regional 
bodies are the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and the 
Assembly of European Regions (AER), consists of a large number of regions and 
counties from throughout Europe with the aim of strengthening influence and 
representation within the different supranational institutions and cooperate organs 
in Europe (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 145). 
To conclude on regions within the EU, the bureau of statistics has divided the 
Union into territorial units, so-called NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
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 Statistics). In turn, these are divided into three levels, ranging from smaller to 
lager areas. As far as possible, the division is based on existing administrative 
units. This demonstrates the heterogeneity of the ‘Europe of Regions’, where 
some Member States such as Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and Ireland have 
such small populations they qualify as regions at the first level (NUTS I) (Jönsson 
et al 2000, pp. 145-146). 
2.4 Europe of Networks 
This scenario implies the principle of territory is no longer the main basis for 
societal organisation.  Instead of being organised through geographical levels — 
regional, supranational, etc. — decisions are being made within informal, policy-
based transgressing networks, with participants from different levels. The 
development of networks is driven by a segmentation of political power where 
each policy area demands a certain expertise and can be seen as a continuation of 
the ongoing process in the EU for the last decades: 
 
The proliferation of networks in the EU can both be seen as a condition and 
as a consequence of the complexity of the formal European framework. As 
the dispersion of power renders hierarchical governance impossible, networks 
provide an alternative mode of policy coordination (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 
130). 
 
The centralising of power in the hand of bureaucrats’ hands undermines 
democratic decision-making on a state level and in this sense efficiency and 
output are valued more than democratic values. Networks can be combined with 
most forms of government; they would probably work best sheltered by another 
formal organisation (Jönsson et al 2003, pp. 203-5).  
Institutional (organisational) networks bind together the different sites and 
entities of economic and political life. When links exist within an organisation, 
such networks can be internal. External or inter-organisational networks bind 
together places of work that belong to different organisations. To apply the 
concept of network, there must exist enduring interdependence between the 
participating entities (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 24).  
Social or cultural networks unite individuals, thus uniting fields of knowledge 
and social environments. These networks are sometimes referred to as ‘social 
webs’ or ‘fabrics’. Many of today’s most important societal functions are 
organised in networks and within the world economy like modern industrial 
production and successful research. Network structures are so prominent, one may 
speak of an emerging network society (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 24). 
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 3 Democratic Theory 
As Alex Warleigh concludes, there has been a normative turn in EU studies. 
Earlier, the two major schools of European Integration did not pay much attention 
to questions about democracy. The so-called neo functionalists studied what they 
perceived to be the ‘mechanics of system-building’ while intergovernmentalists 
explored the diplomatic processes by which national governments cooperated. 
Neo functionalists assumed integration was in the public interest and that 
considerations of democracy could be subsumed in studies of how the system 
worked, intergovernmentalists thought democracy was a non-issue, since 
integration was a case of Member States foreign policy, not a process of polity-
building and democracy therefore was no more relevant than any other area of 
foreign policy (Warleigh 2003, 17).  
Since the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters in 1992, 
European Integration has however been a significantly more controversial issue. 
A debate on the perceived “democratic deficit” of the EU as well as questions of 
what the long term aims should be for European Integration has been raised in 
relation to enlargement of the EU, and in the debates about the constitution 
(Warleigh 2003, p. 22). Despite much attention on the topic of democracy in the 
EU, I agree with Norwegian political scientists Eriksen and Fossum that there is 
lack of “a clear conceptual-theoretical ‘map’ specifically calibrated to suit the 
European experience”, which has led to a difficulty for the debate on democracy 
to connect with the European debate so as to “clarify what is at stake in general 
terms” (2007, p. 2). As a consequence, theoretical tools for, among other things, 
analysing the principal relation between the EP and national parliaments is 
missing. In the following chapter two democratic models will be presented. A 
short overview will precede the discussion of their relevance to the EP. 
3.1 Deliberative Democracy 
3.1.1 Deliberative Theory 
Deliberative democratic theory has over the last decade gained prominence among 
scholars of democracy and European Integration. Some examples include:  
Warleigh (2003) and his account of critical deliberativism, Eriksen and Fossum, 
Dryzek with his discursive deliberativism (1999), Habermas (2003) and Bohman 
(2007).  
Warleigh, guided by a deliberative ideal states: “rather than make half-hearted 
attempts at reform based on liberal democracy, the Union must seek more 
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 imaginative solutions appropriate for its transnational nature”  (2003, p. 2) Among 
the different accounts of deliberative democracy in a European context, I have 
chosen the works of Eriksen and Fossum.  Following a deliberative ideal they 
have developed three models for reconstituting democracy in the EU and address 
the democratic deficit, as well as views on how deliberative democratic theory is 
relevant for analysing democracy in European Integration. 
3.1.2 Eriksen and Fossum; Deliberative Democracy 
According to Eriksen and Fossum, a deliberative ideal is suitable for the EU as it 
is not confined to “the nation-state template and its presuppositions of 
sovereignty, demos, territory and identity; it can therefore also be applied to the 
study of alternative forms” (2007, p. 3). Deliberative democracy can be described 
as a mode of thinking that seeks to reconstruct democracy as governance based 
upon the public use of reason (Eriksen and Fossum 2000, p. 1; c.f Warleigh 2003 
p. 50).  
A basic tenet is that democratic legitimacy requires public justification of 
political decisions to those who are affected by them. In Eriksen and Fossum’s 
theory this can be operationalised through the concepts of congruence and 
accountability. The basic principle behind congruence is those affected by laws 
also should be authorised to make them. Accountability refers to: “justificatory 
process that rests on the reason-giving practise, wherein decision-makers can be 
held responsible to the citizenry, and that, in the last resort, it is possible, to 
dismiss, incompetent rulers” (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 3). According to 
Eriksen and Fossum, representative democracy relies on deliberation to produce 
cogent results. The main argument for deliberative democracy is that a free and 
open discourse brings forth qualitatively better decisions, which are justified to 
the affected parties (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 8). 
For reasons of scale, scope and complexity of a modern political order, to be 
legitimate, it must reconcile the need for rational decision-making, with proper 
representation of affected interests. Public discourse and criticism together with 
party-competition and periodic election are the best ways for realising popular 
sovereignty (ibid. : c.f Warleigh 2003, p. 31).  Both a polity and a forum are 
required. Hence, two conditions for a democratic order can be specified: 
 
• Authoritative institutions equipped with an organised capacity to make 
binding decisions and allocate values; 
• A common communicative space located in civil society, where the 
citizens can jointly form opinions and put power holders to account 
(Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p.8).  
 
To sustain a governmental entity, a measure of territorial control is required, as is 
the performance of certain functions such as resource acquisition (compare the 
view of Jönsson et al on the Westphalian state). For the political system to comply 
with the core tenets of deliberative democracy —congruence and accountability— 
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 some degree of territorial-functional contiguity is required, but it does not have to 
sum up to exclusive territorial control (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 9).  
3.1.3 Representation and Parliamentary Bodies in Deliberative 
Theory  
The public sphere located in civil society, holds a unique position in deliberative 
theory.  This is where everyone has the opportunity to participate in the discussion 
of how common affairs should be handled and where decision-makers can be held 
accountable. This implies equal citizens assembling into a public, constituted by a 
set of civil and political rights and liberties, where the citizens set their own 
agenda through open communication and address an indefinite audience. Public 
discourse is the medium through which members can reflexively address 
themselves and form collective opinions. It connects to the polity through 
different channels of communication. According to Eriksen and Fossum, the 
attendant configuration is a legally entrenched system of representation, identity 
and legitimacy (2007, p. 17). 
The concept of representation refers to procedures and processes for citizens 
to influence political decision-making and the actions of public officials in 
manners generally considered to be legitimate. Eriksen and Fossum state the 
modern conception of representation can be said to be parasitic on deliberation, 
since “no person can consider herself to be legitimately represented unless the 
mandate and accountability terms are spelled out, and the represented are offered 
acceptable justifications for decisions taken on their behalf” (2007, p. 17). 
Representation can be seen as a precondition for political rationality, as it secures 
institutional fora removed from local pressure where elected members of 
constituencies can peacefully and co-operatively seek alternatives, solve problems 
and resolve conflicts on a broader basis. 
Blichner discusses the role of parliaments, as representative institutions, in 
European Integration. In the Maastricht Treaty, concern was expressed about the 
limited role of national parliaments in the EU. A protocol with two parts was 
adopted, with the first part covering the need for national parliaments to acquire 
necessary information in time, and the second defining the role of COSAC. 
Before 1979, when direct elections to the EP where introduced, most EP 
representatives were also members of national parliaments. Direct elections 
removed this link between EP and national parliaments. According to Blichner, 
the change —along with the increasing powers given to the EP— raised fears at 
the national level about the possible development toward a federation. In a federal 
system the relationship between federal and ‘national’ parliaments is established 
constitutionally. A clear division of tasks would mean the federal parliament is 
accountable for decisions taken at the federal level, leaving national parliaments 
accountable for national level decisions. Clearly this is not the case in the EU 
where the European Parliament has limited, albeit increasing powers and where 
decisions at the European level, in the Council of Ministers, are democratically 
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 accountable through each national government’s duty to answer to national 
parliaments (Blichner 2000, pp 141-3). 
In his account of the role of parliaments in European Integration, Blichner also 
discusses the principal role of parliaments. Any democratic theory in some way 
has to explain how the will of the people is transformed into authoritative 
decision-making. Economic theories of democracy answer this question by 
referring to the processes of preference aggregation. According to Blichner, much 
of the criticism against the EU is based on such models; in different ways the 
claims that the aggregation from individual preferences to decisions at the EU 
level is incomplete, distorted or both. Elections to the EP are not based on one 
member, one vote, the discussions tend to concern national issues rather than 
genuinely European issues, the turnout is too low or/and the powers of the EP are 
to small (Blichner 2000, p. 147). Deliberative democratic theory has a different 
point of departure. If the democratic institutions of the EU are to live up to the 
standards of deliberative democratic theory, they have to reflect not only the 
preferences and priorities of the electorate, but more importantly, they must also 
reflect the continuing process of justification existing in the civil sphere. Blichner 
quotes Kerstin Jacobsson, who states the challenge is to develop the: “porous 
relationship between civil society and the decision making system, in open, non-
exclusive ways” (Blichner 2000, p. 147). The legitimacy problem of the EU is 
thus linked to the non-communicative nature of the legislative process; the formal 
powers of the EP have little democratic significance in itself if the link to the civil 
sphere is broken. While what Blichner refer to as ‘economic democratic’2 theory 
focuses on the aggregation process and the formal power to decide, deliberative 
democracy focuses on the communicative power that emanates from free and 
open discussions that are eventually turned into collective preferences. The 
problem on a European level is public spheres have developed poorly. In 
Blichner’s view, this is one reason why Euro-sceptics have more trust in the 
national parliaments acting as guardians of democracy than the European 
Parliament. Still, as long as decisions made at the European level affect people 
across Europe equally, there will still be needs for deliberation across borders 
(Blichner 2000, p. 148). 
Parliamentary sovereignty can be understood as the communication and 
consultation between the sovereign people and its representatives in parliament. A 
deliberative version of democracy takes the principle of accountability even 
further: in a democracy, each should in principle be accountable to all. Ideally, 
this is only possible if everyone affected takes part in the same discussion. As 
previously stated, this is impossible in practise in a modern, complex large-scale 
society. As a result the discussion has to be institutionalised. The parliament must 
deliberate for all. Eriksen makes a distinction between opinion formation —the 
domain of the public sphere — and will formation —the domain for decision—
making units within the political system. Publics do not act, as they possess no 
decision-making agency. In public discussions, however, problems are identified 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Blichner refers to Jon Elster 
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 and solutions formulated, thematised and dramatised in such a way that they 
potentially become relevant for parliamentary bodies (Eriksen 2000, p. 54). 
3.1.4 Three (sub)models for Reconstituting European Democracy 
A democratic system that complies with the criteria of congruence and 
accountability presupposes a particular relationship between the public sphere and 
the polity. This can however give rise to many different kinds of institutional 
configurations and thus result in quite different political systems (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2007, p. 10). Using deliberative democratic theory as a yardstick, Eriksen 
and Fossum have developed three models, which they claim provide solutions to 
the democratic challenges European Integration faces (2003, p. 3). Even though 
they claim all models are normatively justified, objections are raised regarding 
their feasibility. As stated earlier the models have great similarities with some 
presented scenarios.  
The first sub model for ‘delegated democracy’ envisages democracy as being 
directly, and exclusively associated with the nation state. The underlying 
assumptions is only the nation state can generate the solidarity and trust that is 
required in a democratic polity (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 11). In this model 
the EU is a functional regime aimed at problem solving in a globalized context, 
for issues the Member States cannot handle alone (i.e. environmental problems, 
migration and cross-border crime). The model presupposes the Member States 
delegate competence to the EU, which in principle can be revoked. Democratic 
authorisation from the Member States could take different institutional forms, like 
intergovernmental bodies in which contracting parties negotiate or a Union-wide 
representative body. The latter would only serve as an agent of audit democracy 
not a representative body — and together with transnational and/or supranational 
institutions (such as a court) supervise and control the EU’s actions (ibid.). 
According to Eriksen and Fossum, European Integration has proceeded beyond 
the model’s core requirement. An early sign was the institutionalisation of a 
“High Authority”, later the commission with some regulatory competence apart 
from the contracting parties (the Member States’ governments). The legal 
structure, with the ECJ acting as a trustee of the treaties (and not as an agent of the 
Member States) as well as EU conferring citizenship rights and Europeans being 
represented in the directly elected EP are also signs of this.  The Union has 
increased its democratic ambitions to direct legitimacy. Due to complex 
interdependence and economic globalisation, rolling back the EU’s democratic 
structures would not, according to Eriksen and Fossum “rescue” national 
democracies and give power back to national parliaments. At most, it would 
ensure procedural accountability, as opposed a substantive one (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2007, pp. 14-5). In many ways this model resembles the Europe of States 
scenario. 
The second sub-model rests on the notion of democracy, in which all political 
authority emanates from laws laid down in the name of the people, a constitution.  
The legitimacy of the law stems from the presumption that it is made by the 
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 people, or their representatives. Applied to the EU this kind of polity would 
require a common European identity —a collective and symbolic ‘we’— and 
would be institutionally equipped to claim direct legitimacy. This requires 
authoritative institutions, including a parliament, at the Union level, organised 
along federal lines and equipped with final word in those matters falling under 
each level’s respective jurisdiction. Today, however, the EU’s own institutions are 
at their weakest in the core state functions: taxation, military and police. The 
European Parliaments lack many of the powers of federal parliament. The EU is 
also far more institutionally diverse than most federal states (Eriksen and Fossum 
2007 p. 16). This sub model is close to the United States of Europe scenario. 
The third sub-model envisages democracy beyond the nation state template. 
The EU has obtained competencies and capabilities that resemble those of an 
authoritative government. The bearing idea is that  ‘government’ does not have to 
be equivalent with ‘state’. As such,  it is therefore possible to conceive of a non-
state, democratic polity with explicit government functions. This also results in 
the possibility to accommodate a greater measure of territorial-functional 
differentiation. The Union’s democratic legitimacy will be based on the 
credentials of criss-crossing public debate, multileveled democratic decision-
making procedures and the protection of fundamental rights to ensure an 
‘autonomous’ civil (transnational) society (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 21). The 
question is, how such an entity can be effective in the lack of coercive measures. 
When Member States hold the monopoly on violence, such an order can only be 
effective to the degree that actors comply on the basis of voluntary consent. The 
answer from Eriksen and Fossum is through a series of ‘soft’ mechanisms that 
range from “moral consensus on human rights, via consultancy, deliberation and 
problem-solving transnational structure of governance, to the institutionalised 
procedures for authoritative decision-making un intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions, which are similar to the ones that at the national level 
confer legitimacy upon results” (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, pp. 20-1). 
When applying the model to the EU, according to Eriksen and Fossum two 
implications arise: firstly, reconstituting democracy in Europe entails decoupling 
government as the democratic form of rule, from the state form. Secondly, the 
model posits that the borders of the Union are not drawn on essentialist grounds. 
The EU, can therefore only justify itself through drawing on the principles of 
human rights democracy and rule of law. The core assumption is European 
citizens will be able to consider themselves as self-legislating citizens within the 
functional domain that is the exclusive preserve of the European government 
(ibid.). 
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 3.2 Representative Democracy 
3.2.1 Representative Theory 
In comparison with proponents of deliberative democracy, adherents of 
representative democracy have been more hesitant in developing specific 
democratic models for the EU. The reason is probably that many theorists — 
including, the perhaps most prominent, Andrew Moravcsik — have considered 
the national state, with its clearly demarcated demos, as the natural unit for 
democracy (Moravcsik 2002). A different position is taken by Christopher Lord 
who has conducted a democratic audit —  a concept originally developed by 
Beetham and Weir for assessing the democracy in the United Kingdom — of the 
EU.  For conducting his audit, Lord employs a model that uses ‘modified 
consociationalism’  complemented with what Lord refers to as concurrent consent 
(for other accounts of consociationalism and EU, see for example Gabel 1998).  
3.2.2 Basic Tenets of Audit Democracy 
The core definition of democracy, from which Lord carries out the audit is: public 
control with political equality. The argument for this minimum condition is 
inductive and runs as follows: a democracy is conceivable where the citizens do 
not rule in person, but not one where they do not control those who make 
decisions in their name. If some people, however were to count for more than 
others in exercising that public control, the resulting system would be rule of 
some people by others, rather than rule by the people (Lord, 2004, p. 10). From 
this core value, a number of mediating values emanate: authorisation, 
participation, responsiveness, representation, transparency, accountability and 
solidarity.  
Given this conclusion Lord develops two sets of tests for determining the level 
of democracy in the EU. The first is based on ‘modified consociationalism’ and 
stipulates four requirements: 
 
1. Provide inclusive and proportional representation of office-
holders designated by national democracies; 
2. Respect the autonomy of national democratic practices; 
3. Allow representatives of national democracies to retain veto 
rights in matters they consider of vital importance; 
4. Representatives of national democracies are themselves open 
to control by their publics or national parliaments in how they 
exercise the powers and rights of each national democracy 
within the EU’s institutional order  
(Lord 2004a, p. 26-27) 
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 The first three of these conditions are taken from consociational theory developed 
by Arend Lijphart, while the forth is designed by Lord to suit the situation in the 
EU (Lord, 2004, p. 26).  
The second test is referred to as ‘concurrent consent’ by Lord. In a 
consociational European democracy it is assumed representatives of the national 
democracies control the institutions in the EU, often with formally equal rights 
and veto rights. ‘Concurrent consent’ conversely requires national representatives 
not only reach a high level of consensus between them but also with those elected 
for the express purpose of representing the public in Union institutions. By 
definition, however, this requires consensus between two representative bodies 
(Lord 2004a, p. 25). The EU today consists of both elements. It uses modified 
consociationalism for assigning competences that can be exercised in designated 
areas by decision rules of concurrent consent (Lord 2004a, p. 223). 
The units of analysis for Lord’s democratic audit includes specific procedures 
and policy instruments, each institution of the Union3, the three pillars, the Union 
as a whole and lastly processes of institutional design (Lord 2004a, p. 36).  
3.2.3 What Kind of Representation? 
Democracy through representation is at the centre of Lord’s model. 
Representation, however, is multidimensional and contested concept. 
  
Some hold that there are particular human needs that can only be understood 
by representatives who resemble the represented. Others argue that what 
matters is not resemblance but mechanism that make it likely that 
representatives will act on the preferences of the represented. Still others 
doubt if even that is necessary; representatives may be expected to use their 
judgement in ways that may be unpopular with the represented (Lord 2004a, 
p. 96).  
 
Other important questions include whether the representatives would have to take 
public decisions themselves, or if it is enough to have some ultimate control over 
those who actually decide? To what degree should representatives compete or 
cooperate with each other? Should they concentrate on bargaining the preferences 
of those they represent, or should they also take part in deliberations aimed at 
discovering commonly agreed norms for regulating aspects of the common lives 
of community members? On top of these classic questions of representation there 
are specific questions about political representation in the EU.  
To cut through this indeterminacy, Lord makes two working assumptions 
about representation. Common for all definitions is the first idea of ‘standing in 
for others’. The second is most expectations from citizens and societies are likely 
to presuppose high levels of agreement, either between those ‘standing-in’ for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 The Commission, the Council of Ministers, the EP, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) 
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 national cultural segments of the Union or between those capable of articulating 
the Union-level cleavages that cross-cut Member States (such as left-right values) 
or some mixture of the two” (Lord 2004a, p. 97).  
Given the diversity of the European societies there are however a multitude of 
representational categories. Lord analyses representation based on nation-
territory, region, interest and ideology. Nation-territorial input to the legislative 
powers of the Union are made through the European Parliament. Member States 
form the constituencies for elections to the EP with each receiving a fixed 
allocation of seats. Most Members of European Parliament (MEPs) also owe their 
election to parties that are represented in national parliaments, although they are 
organised in transnational party groups in the EP. Voting is also often organised 
by the bureaux on which each national party is represented, with most groups 
attempting to agree by consensus of national party delegations (Lord 2004a, p. 
101). With regard to the allocation of seats in the EP Lord states the current 
composition is close to the limits of proportionate to population when using the 
Member States as constituencies and guaranteeing the smallest states a minimum 
representative base (Lord 2004a, pp. 104-5). 
Lord also discusses regional representation. The Commission has argued 
responsiveness in general would be enhanced by a direct interface between Union 
institutions and those territorial units of governance closest to citizens. The trend 
towards regionalisation and decentralisation mean increasingly sub-national 
authorities often are EUs partners in implementation. The Maastricht Treaty 
introduced the Committee of Regions (CoR) that must be consulted when policies 
are introduced under certain articles. According to Lord, the EP expresses the 
probably widespread view that despite the creation of the Committee of Region, 
region authorities often feels sidelined. In the EP’s view, tensions have been 
caused by the Committee setup, where prime ministers of the largest regional 
governments sit alongside small town mayors. Diversity in the sub-national 
composition makes it difficult for the Union to structure local and regional 
authorities into a single representative institution to the satisfaction of all (Lord 
2004a, 109). 
Regardless of how effectively regions or Member States can function as 
intermediates between citizens and EU institutions it is doubtful whether any 
system of territorial representation can satisfy all the representative needs of 
citizens in European arena. A fundamental problem is the needs and interests of 
citizens may crosscut national and regional territorial divisions. Interest 
representation would be one way to channelling what Philip Schmitter refers to as 
the “transversal preferences of Euro-proletarians, Euro-professionals, Euro-
consumers, Euro-environmentalist, Euro-feminists, Euro-regionalists, Euro-youths 
or just plain Euro-citizens” (cited in Lord 2004a, pp.111-2). Early European 
Communities attempted to institutionalise interest representation through the 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which the Treaties require to be 
consulted on a range of legislative issues. In spite of attempts to update its role 
and composition the EESC was constructed on corporatist assumptions that 
interest representation would be effectively delivered through tripartite 
 24
 discussions between employer organisations, labour unions and political 
authorities. 
There is however limits to the democratic representation that can be delivered 
through interest based policy networks on how to: 
 
• Represent the diffuse public interests left over after individual lobbies 
have influenced the political system without reward for the cumulative 
external effects of their specific actions 
• Allow organised private interests access without capture of what is 
after all a public process 
• Avoid reproducing the inequalities already to be found in society 
(Lord 2004, p. 114) 
 
In a representative democracy, the shortcomings of interest representation are 
normally met through a system of political parties. Their role is in bundling issues 
into broad programmes, which deal with the problem that key choices of value are 
not only to be found in the management of one policy but, in trade-offs between 
several (Lord 2004a, p. 115).  Parties can also facilitate responsible government if 
their party programmes and actions are coherent. The party programme can be 
viewed as a form of ex ante public control, where the public can scrutinise what 
the parties seek when in office. The scope of holding a party responsible for its 
record – with reputational costs and benefits, sometimes persisting for decades – 
is conversely a power instrument ex post accountability (Lord 2004a, p. 116) 
Moreover, parties are also radical simplifiers allowing citizens to participate in 
complex democratic processes with little or minimal information.  
Given these features of political parties, the lack of specific European parties 
is often viewed as a defect in the EU’s capacity to deliver representative politics. 
The case of the EU being a party-less political system, incapable of 
ideological representation is, however, not straightforward. There are a series of 
party formations on a European level, consisting both of federations of national 
parties and multinational party groups in the EP (that somewhat correspond to the 
federations) (ibid.). This can according to Lord be seen as a complete party 
structure in two senses. First, it covers most ideological groupings common to the 
member societies of the Union (Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Socialists 
and Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens and Euro sceptics). Second, the federation 
and groups feed into several institutions of the Union. Within the EP in particular 
there are indications, the EU party system has stability, cohesion and defined 
dimensionality (Lord 2004a, p 117; see also Lindberg 2008 for a study on party 
cohesion in the EP). The representative qualities of the EP can be questioned, as 
no EU citizen has the opportunity to vote directly for the transnational party 
groups in the EP and the only mass membership parties with roots in civil society 
are national ones. The key question here according to Lord is whether this split-
level party system provides an adequate electoral link between the represented 
and their parliamentary representatives (Lord 2004a, p. 119). The scepticism has 
mostly focused on the ‘second order character of the elections’, which imply that 
the European elections do not have much to do with the institution that is in fact 
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 being elected, but about national political issues. If this is the case European 
election do not deliver neither ex ante nor ex post representation. The observation 
that European elections are often fought on domestic issues does not in itself 
justify the conclusion that they are irrelevant to the functioning of the Union, as 
this would require that national and EU issues are neatly separable and that 
choices made in relation to one cannot in some sense function as proxies for the 
other. Many MEPs taking part in a survey characterised the content of European 
elections as Union issues framed in a national context (Lord 2004a, p 125).  
Another criticism is the development of the EU party system as an outgrowth 
of national party politics duplicates a conventional left-right focus, which in turn 
prevents the overall structure from adding any value to how citizens are being 
represented at a European level (Lord 2004a, p. 121). Similar criticism have also 
been constructed around the ability of national parties to block the entry of more 
transnational parties. In the Laeken Declaration, the possibility of reserving some 
EP seats (perhaps 10 or 20 percent) to be allocated in proportion to votes cast on 
Union level, as a way to create incentives for parties to present themselves in a 
form suitable to more than one Member State (ibid.). 
Lords conclusions about the present outlook for ideological, interest and 
regional representation are: the first are constrained by shortcomings in the EP’s 
electoral connection; the second by inequalities; the third is only patchily 
developed (Lord 2004a, p. 129).  
3.3 Theoretical Framework – A Comparison of the 
Two Models 
The earlier part of this chapter has illustrated central differences between the two 
democratic models, on the concept of representation as well as the role of 
parliamentary institutions. When it comes to representation Lord’s model of audit 
democracy examines how well preference aggregation works, in relation to social 
cleavages in societies on a European level. 
Eriksen and Fossum’s deliberative account takes a different view and focuses 
on the opinion and preference formation driven by deliberations in public sphere. 
The parliaments act as an intermediary public sphere (either through COSAC, or 
directly between the EP and the national parliaments). 
The two models do however have connection points. The most obvious is 
Eriksen and Fossum views on public deliberation in combination with 
representation with party elections producing the best democratic results. Lord 
also mentions the importance of the deliberative features of representative 
institutions, in reference to John Stuart Mill and his view of parliaments as 
‘congresses of opinions’ (Lord 2004a, p. 24). 
Eriksen and Fossum refer to the concept of delegated, audit democracy in their 
first model. In their definition, this would not Lord’s second set: Namely that the 
elected should not only reach a high level of consensus between themselves but 
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 also with those elected for the express purpose of representing the public in Union 
institutions (‘concurrent consent’). 
The democratic models also have differing views on the roles of parliament, 
Eriksen and Fossum emphasise the link to the public sphere as essential for 
democratic legitimacy. Lord on the other hand, focuses on representation as “high 
levels of agreement either between those ‘standing-in’ for the national cultural 
segments of the Union or between those capable of articulating the Union-level 
cleavages that cross-cut Member Stats or some mixture of the two. Representation 
in Eriksen and Fossum’s model, ultimately also implies that through public 
discourse and civil society, each should in principle be accountable to all. 
As earlier stated, the models of Eriksen and Fossum share many similarities 
with the scenarios. The audit democracy is similar to Europe of the States; federal 
democracy is the same as United States of Europe, while Cosmopolitan 
democracy is involves the network structures presented in Europe of Networks 
and at the same time as it is a non-territorial form of organisation, not dependent 
on the nation state template. 
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 4 Analysis – The Four Scenarios 
Revisited 
Having described the democratic models and the scenarios, the models will now 
be applied. The aim is not to elaborate in great detail on how every model can be 
applied in each scenario, but to investigate principle questions arising when the 
‘scenario meets the models’. 
One way of understanding the deepening European integration is in the terms 
of the EU’s widening geographical domain, expanding functional scope and 
enhanced institutional capacity (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 121). To illustrate each 
scenario, the same terms will be used to analyse the EP’s position. Geographical 
domain refers to the number of countries involved. As one scenario is focused on 
geographical units other than nation-states (namely, regions) the term will be 
modified here to refer the territorial entities that serve as constituencies. 
Functional scope refers to issue-areas on the European agenda. Institutional 
capacity regards the capacity to make, implement and enforce decisions (Jönsson 
et al 2000, p. 121).The question, therefore, is whether the parliamentary model is 
relevant for all scenarios, and what it would mean in each of them. 
The three earlier-presented principal relations between the EP and national 
parliaments will also be discussed in relation to each scenario. The first view is 
that the controlling roles of the EP and national parliaments are additive and 
complementary. A second, is that national parliaments have delegated powers to 
the overall complex of Union institutions, all of which they must monitor if they 
are to ensure no one oversteps the terms of their agency. The third viewpoint 
concludes that as the EP is the parliament of the European Union, it has the 
responsibility to scrutinise all three pillars, given that any meaningful public 
control may need to include all the external effects that certain decisions taken 
under one pillar might have on the other two. 
4.1 Europe of States 
• Geographical domain: EU Member States.  
• Functional scope: Transnational issues that cannot be solved within 
each Member State, no influence on core state functions such as 
military, security, police and taxation 
• Institutional capacity: Agent for audit democracy,  
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 4.1.1 Deliberative Model 
As stated earlier, this scenario is similar to the first of Eriksen and Fossum’s three 
models (‘delegated democracy’). The role of a union-wide representative body as 
the EP would therefore be limited to Eriksen and Fossum’s definition of it as 
delegated democracy, rather than representative democracy (Eriksen and Fossum 
2007, p . 12). Such an assembly would therefore not be able to pass laws or 
expand the Union’s competencies. 
The ultimate decision making power would be in the hands of the Member 
States’ governments. Considering the core tenets of Eriksen and Fossum’s 
models, a common European communicative space would be lacking, a problem 
they do not address when constructing their model. As Blichner points out, 
provided decisions are made at a European level, equally affecting people across 
Europe, there will be a need for deliberation across borders.  This problem might 
be remedied by an interparliamentary association such as COSAC, functioning as 
an intermediary public sphere connecting the many, separate, national 
communicative spaces.  I would, however, argue that it is unlikely for this 
solution to address to the problem sufficient, especially considering the low 
activity of COSAC today. 
Another challenge in this scenario is the lack of transparency in traditional 
intergovernmental conferences, at which, decision-making is made behind closed 
doors. In the tenets, it is stipulated that a common communicative space is an 
arena where citizens jointly form opinions jointly and power-holders are held 
accountable. Given the closed structures of negotiations, it will be hard for 
citizens to hold power-holders accountable, since it is unclear who is responsible. 
Deliberations must also go beyond elite level. The deliberative model’s fit to this 
scenario can be questioned.  
A further objection is what effects globalisation and interdependence, will 
have, i.e. the question of whether it is possible to roll back integration and return 
influence to the governments of Member States. Eriksen and Fossum state rolling 
back of European Integration only would amount to procedural accountability; 
effects of the decisions taken by each Member State would be small and the 
institutional capacity low. It is notoriously difficult to confine supranational 
bodies to the role of agent democracy, since for purposes of efficiency and 
representation they might argue for the need of a supranational representative 
body (Eriksen and Fossum 2007 p. 14). A case in point is the EP -who started out 
as an assembly- was close to the audit ideal but was turned into a directly elect 
European representative body. 
4.1.2 Representative Model 
This scenario suits the basic demands posed by audit-democracy. Lord, however, 
also raises the same doubts about the feasibility of rolling back European 
Integration in regard to output legitimacy, or as in the words of Jönsson et al: 
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 “[t]erritorial systems of accountability no longer necessarily coincide with the 
spatial reach of sites of power” (2000, p. 178)”. 
Issues of representation present a further stumbling block. This scenario will 
only give regard to national-territorial identities, represented through each of the 
Member States’ elected governments. Given the level of economic and social 
integration in Europe, other identities, for example regional or local might 
develop, but not be represented. Regardless of how well the national parliaments 
represent their citizens and exert their influence within EU institutions, it is also 
doubtful whether any system of territorial representation can satisfy all the 
representative needs of the citizens in the European arena (Lord 2004a, p 111).  
Ideological representation would probably also be insufficient, since it is unlikely 
that trans-European party systems would develop without a clearly designated 
locus, a representative decision making body. 
In relation to principal relations between the EP and national parliaments, this 
scenario would be close to the second view, in which national parliaments have 
delegated powers to the overall complex of Union institutions, all of which they 
must monitor if they are to ensure they do not overstep the terms of their agency. 
4.2 United States of Europe 
• Geographical domain: Federal EU Member States.  
• Functional scope: All the issues that in the constitution are defined to 
be on federal level  
• Institutional capacity: Strong EP with direct representative links to the 
citizens. 
4.2.1 Deliberative Model 
As Blichner stated, a federal model requires a constitution in which a clear 
division of tasks between national and federal levels is established. As one of the 
core requirements of Eriksen and Fossum’s democratic model, is that decisions 
have to be agreed upon by those affected (congruence), by analogy this would 
thus require that the national parliaments’ of the Member States agree on the 
creation of a European federation. In order to get majoritarian decisions accepted 
by the minority, the governed represented in the parliament must have a certain 
level of social unity, in the form some sort of a common identity. 
For the EU to comply with this scenario, it would have to be reconstituted as a 
polity, including not only increased competencies but also the establishment of 
direct representative links to the citizens, in all relevant functional domains 
(Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 19). This would require the EP to be transformed 
into a federal parliament, with full legislative powers concerning all issues at a 
federal level.  
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 To be legitimate, a federal Union must also be institutionally equipped to 
claim direct legitimation and the European institutions must be able to sustain 
identity-building processes. Given already existing national projects, as well as 
strong regional identities within Europe, the proper design would result in multi-
national federal state (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 16). If this process is 
successful, there should be no principal objections against the formation of a 
federal state from the deliberative democratic perspective. 
Inter-parliamentary discourse between national parliaments and EP might help 
provide certain legitimacy, however not to a sufficient degree for the justification 
of a federal system. 
4.2.2 Representative Model 
With regard to Lord’s democratic model, and the different forms of 
representation, one objection can be raised on whether a federal design would fit 
the social cleavages in Europe (in line with the consociational feature of Lord’s 
model), with voting directly for a transnational European party group.  The 
question is if they provide an adequate electoral link between the represented and 
their parliamentary representatives. In practice, if no consideration to the border 
of national states is given, it would probably mean that smaller member states 
would not be guaranteed a MEP in the EP. If citizens feel attached to their nation 
states, or regions a mismatch would occur. 
Another risk is that the deliberation might be too fragmented to be aggregated 
into a single public space at the European level. In the case of EU and a federal 
state, democratisation and identity formation stand in an unusually problematic 
relationship (Lord 2004a p. 21). The EU today according to Lord is best described 
as a plurality of polities at differentiated levels of aggregation (ibid.). 
Regarding the principal relation between EP and national parliaments, the 
scenario can fit both the first and the third view. In a federal system the 
controlling roles of the EP and national parliaments can be seen as mainly 
additive, since a constitution will define the competence of each institution, and 
given a common European identity, the institutions will have common interests in 
representing the citizens of the EU. The third view concludes the EP as the 
parliament of the European Union, has responsibility to scrutinise all three pillars, 
if meaningful public control may need to include the external effects of decisions 
taken under one pillar on the other two. Even though this view implies a blurring 
of the distinction between federal and national level, it is still a likely outcome, 
given that the EP vies itself as a legitimate representative of the European citizens. 
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 4.3 Europe of Regions 
• Geographical domain: Regions of Europe. 
• Functional scope: Issues that transcend each region, on Pareto efficient 
basis? 
• Institutional capacity: Unclear, especially regarding authoritative, 
binding decisions. 
 
Even though the process of regionalisation described in this scenario is connected 
to modern globalisation, historical analogies can help considerations of what is at 
stake in terms of democracy. In an article examining democracy and the effects of 
the Maastricht Treaty for EU Member States, Robert Dahl discusses the dilemma 
between system effectiveness and citizen participation.  According to him, the 
dilemma transcends the EU: “it exists whenever societies and economies within 
democratic states are subject to significant external influences beyond their 
control. It has, therefore, existed ever since the idea and practice of democracy 
evolved in ancient Greece 2500 years ago.” (1994, p. 24)  
The history of democracy, according to Dahl, can be seen as consisting of 
three great transformations. The first occurred during the opening half of the 5th 
B.C where Grecian non-democratic, small-scale city-states developed into 
assembly democracies. In the next stage, the city-state was made obsolete by the 
emergence of large-scale nation-states. This was made possible by the concept of 
representative democracy. The third transformation is, taking place now, as 
countries boundaries’, even those as large as the United States, have become 
smaller than those of the decisions that significantly affected the fundamental 
interests of its citizens (Dahl 1994, pp. 25-27).  This transformation however, has 
democratic implications, as suggested in the title of his article— namely a 
dilemma between efficiencies — in the sense of solving pressing issues, for 
example environmental issues, and the access and participation of citizens’ access 
and participation in these new supranational institutions. The scenario of 
regionalisation can be viewed a backlash to this development, with the potential to 
provide closer links between citizens and their elected representatives, but with 
the risk of losing output efficiency.  
Loughlin makes an important point in distinguishing between regionalism, as 
an inherently bottom-up process with set of demands from regional actors (usually 
related to greater control over political, social, cultural or economic development 
of the region) to central governments and regionalisation which is top-down 
approach to regional problems from central governments (1999, p. 5). The 
question in this scenario is whether the regions will replicate state institutions and 
functioning, which in the case of representation would include representative 
institutions, or if new forms of organising the political entities will arise. 
The diversity of the sub-national composition makes it difficult for the Union 
to structure local and regional authorities as a single representative institution that 
secures the satisfaction of all involved (Lord 2004a, 109). The EP has concluded 
that this makes it hard to involve regions in more than consultation (EP 2002, p. 
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 5). The question is, to what extent the regions could organise themselves, and how 
issues about, for example, equality between regions would be addressed within 
these institutions. 
4.3.1 Deliberative Model 
A multitude of organisational forms can be pictured in this scenario. Returning to 
the two tenets for deliberative democracy, the question is how a system of 
authoritative institutions equipped with an organised capacity to make binding 
decisions can be achieved within a regional framework and if a common 
communicative space can develop. The question has both internal and external 
dimensions; how regions can organise internally and how their external relations 
between each other will be managed. In the scenario description different types of 
regions are mentioned, Jönsson et al state that the kind of regionalising processes 
can reinforce each other, and that when this happens strong region develops.  
Internally, within the region, ethnic and cultural features can supply the necessary 
common identity for a communicative public sphere. The functional and 
administrative features can affect the ability to develop authoritative institutions. 
The external dimension is however more unclear. How will the relations between 
the regions be organised? Given the demand for authoritative institutions, able to 
make binding decisions diversity in regions will pose a problem, since diverse 
regions most likely will have different needs and views on cooperation. Regions 
organised in loosely based policy groupings, where each region can choose what 
areas to participate in will be hard to reconcile with Eriksen and Fossum’s 
demand for authoritative institutions, able to make binding decisions and allocate 
values. 
If the Regions organise themselves in representative institutions, the 
possibility of a European Parliament consisting of representatives from regions 
would not constitute a problem. As both are territorial forms of organisation, a 
parliament of regions could function in a similar fashion of parliament of nation 
states.  
4.3.2 Representative Model 
With reference to Loughlin the question is whether this scenario is a result of 
regionalisation or regionalism. In either case, regions replicating the role and 
organisation of the national state are conceivable. As a reaction to the 
Commissions White Paper on Governance the Catalan (regional) parliament 
expressed the following demands: 
 
• The Committee of the Regions should be directly elected. 
• The Commission and Council should have to give a direct explanation 
for why they do not follow a recommendation from the CoR 
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 • COSAC should be extended to include regional assemblies with 
legislative powers. 
• Regional, not national, parliaments should have the rights to scrutiny 
where they, and not Member States, are implementing authority, or 
where they would have been the legislating body had their country not 
joined the EU (cited in Lord 2004a, p. 110). 
 
The ambition of replicating national state institutions is clear. As earlier stated the 
institutional setup of diverse regions is problematic, where the prime ministers of 
the largest regional governments sit next to mayors of small town. As with the 
other forms of territorial representation, it is questionable if regional 
representation will be the only important dimension of representation. If a system 
of regional representation can deliver representative democracy, there are no 
principal objections from Lord’s model.  
4.4 Europe of Networks 
• Geographical domain: Unclear, as it is not a territorial form of 
organisation (in Eriksen and Fossum’s account, a cosmopolitan idea)  
• Functional scope: All issues network actors can bring up 
• Institutional capacity: Unclear. The question is to what extent EP will 
have the traditional parliamentary powers to implement and enforce 
decisions.  
 
This scenario poses a challenge to the parliamentary model, while meeting the 
fundamental problem, of needs and interests of citizens crosscutting national and 
regional territorial divisions. The question is what role the nation states, and EU 
and their institutions will play in the scenario. As with the scenario Europe of 
Regions many different designs are possible. Returning to the understanding of 
network, and what separates this form of organisation from others can provide 
some guidance. Territory is distinguished from its environment by boundaries, 
who decide the difference between inside and outside. Moreover the term is also 
used to designate ‘political space’ or ‘power sphere’. Networks depict the 
geographic space as points (nodes) connected by lines (links), discrimination 
between nodes that are tied to the net and those who are not (Jönsson et al 2000, 
99). The question of access is thus a defining feature of a network. Only small 
networks with a limited number of participants can be flat (where each node is 
directly connected all others) and open to all actors4, access is therefore a critical 
source of power and domination (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 101).  Applying these 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 As Jönsson et al illustrates with simple arithmetic, a flat network with four nodes require six channels of 
communication, six nodes 30; 100 nodes, 4950, 1000 nodes; 499,500. 
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 theoretical insights on policy networks the question is how access will be granted, 
what institutions take the form of centralising nodes. 
 Even though networks challenge the authority of nation state, states tend to 
occupy central positions in policy networks in the EU. Since states often have the 
capability to reach as well as being reached by most other organisations in 
networks, they often have ‘linking pin’ positions. The notion of states sovereignty 
also remains a bargaining asset in transnational networks (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 
176).  The question is what role a representative institution such as the EP can 
play in this scenario of network governance. The position as a central network 
node, with a ‘linking pin’ status would be depending on its authority and decision-
making abilities. This is however just what scenario challenges, as the 
parliamentary model with neutral bureaucracy set out execute the policies decided 
by the parliament, has given way to policy networks.  
4.4.1 Deliberative Model 
Networks can be combined with many forms of government. An initial question is 
therefore how well the scenario fits Eriksen and Fossum’s model of cosmopolitan 
democracy, with its clear network traits and legitimacy based on criss-crossing 
public debate in multi-levelled, democratic decision-making procedures. As 
policy-making implementation and law enforcement would take place within a 
variety of organisations (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p. 22), the role of the EP 
would come closest to a node in the network of decision-making. 
As Eriksen and Fossum state: a particularly tricky issue for non-state based 
entities is how to ensure democratic ideals of congruence and accountability. The 
answer for the assurance of accountability is that the EU handles a limited range 
of functions in which it has final authority, within a system of certain fundamental 
legal guarantees. When it comes to congruence, it possesses a different status 
since it cannot simply refer back to a delimited democratic constituency, but must 
always balance the requirements of certain constituency with the: “universal 
principles embedded in cosmopolitan law” (ibid.). Civil society and the public 
sphere must therefore have a central role in demanding and ensuring proper 
justificatory accounts.  
Focusing on the role of the EP, the basic question is how parliaments can be 
combined with network decision-making. In the parliamentary model, elected 
representatives make decisions that neutral bureaucracies then execute. The notion 
of multi-level, crisscrossing decision making challenges this, as actors outside of 
the representative system make and implement decisions. Can it still play a role as 
intermediary link between the public sphere and the parliamentary democracy? 
According to Blichner, the interparliamentary co-operation he advocates, 
already takes place in an arena that is more institutionalised than public spheres in 
civil society, but less institutionalised than parliamentary institutions both at 
national and European level (Blichner 2000, p. 142).  Still, as pointed out earlier: 
publics cannot make decisions; a central feature of parliamentary institutions is 
making decisions (or in the words of Eriksen and Fossum, will formation). The 
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 point of co-operation between national parliaments and the EP is also for the 
national parliaments to influence the decision-making agenda, and for the EP to 
get input from and legitimacy Member States. If the EP lacks an institutional 
capacity to legislate and make decision binding, the point of the deliberation with 
national parliaments disappears. 
Smismans argues functional representation, through institutions such as 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is an alternative way to ensure 
legitimacy of European policy-making, “given the limits of territorial 
representation, and given the particular heterogeneity of the ‘European demos’” 
(1998, p. 6). The deliberative features of a body consisting of socio-occupational 
representatives as the EESC has yet to be proven. The EESC also highlights the 
general problem of access to networks, and how to identify legitimate 
stakeholders. 
4.4.2 Representative Model 
Lords model is focused on national states as political units, which badly suits the 
network scenario. The developing of policy networks is viewed a result of the 
diverse nature of the EU: “A dispersed and decentred polity is almost bound to be 
in constant search of co-ordination mechanisms that operate, as it were, ‘behind 
the back’ of formal institutional rules” (Lord 2004b, p. 3). 
Not surprisingly critique is directed against the democratic qualities of 
network governance in the EU, on the basis in of the basic tenets of his model: 
public control and political equality. According to Lord the argument EU is, or 
should be a ‘postnational non-state political system’ is often taken to imply that it 
should also be a post-parliamentary one (Lord 2004b, p. 5) He claims there still 
has been attempts to design systems of network governance to mimic the 
parliamentary model. The most ambitious attempt is be found in the advocacy of 
proceduralisation from the Forward Studies Unit (FSU, 1997) of the European 
Commission. The proper role of the Commission is: 
 
[N]ot so much to decide as to facilitate: to ensure representatives of all 
affected by a decision really do have access to the stakeholder networks that 
should increasingly takeover the tasks of policy framing and evaluation; to 
equalise the ‘material and cognitive’ resources available to different 
stakeholders; to ensure any one policy is ‘evaluated from the point of view’ 
of all others; and to encourage ‘collective learning’ and the substitution of 
public reason for purely private preference formation. Thus stakeholders 
should be asked to ‘clarify the presuppositions they bring to a particular 
issue’, to reflect on the contingency of their models’ and to ‘demonstrate the 
coherence of their constructions, not only in terms of their positions but in 
terms of the positions of others as they have evolved during a process of 
collective learning. (Lord 2004b, p. 8) 
 
The starting point of the critique is that every stage of the proposed mimicking of 
parliamentary politics depends on criteria for:  determination of patterns of access 
and participation, transparency and publicity, fairness and equality of opportunity 
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 and resources, deciding what is better argument and what it is to meet deliberative 
standards such as ‘good reasoning’ (Lord 2004b, p. 9).  
The most cumbersome criteria to set is how to identify stakeholders (for 
similar critique Karlsson 2008). Even assuming stakeholder networks are able to 
identify and include all those affected by their decisions, the risk is that a 
cartelising of public benefits in manner that favours insiders at the expense of 
outsiders (Lord 2004b, p. 10). The earlier mentioned general problems with policy 
networks are highly relevant for the scenario: 
 
• Represent the diffuse public interests that is left over after individual 
lobbies have influenced the political system, without reward for the 
cumulative external effects of their specific actions. 
• Allow organised private interests access, without capture of what is 
after all a public process. 
• Avoid reproducing the inequalities already to be found in society  
(Lord 2004a, p. 114). 
 
Network governance can perhaps deliver Pareto-efficient deals but no political 
equality – as access to networks is unequal — or public control – as the ultimate 
control of the networks does not lie in the hands of the citizens — which are the 
core definition of democracy in Lords model.  
Beetham and Lord conclude that democratic governance in networks is 
impossible without representative institutions: 
 
 [C]lassification of the EU as a non-state political system does not remove the 
need for it to meet the same standards of legitimation as a liberal-democratic 
state. The central implication is that the Union cannot escape the need for 
representative institutions if it is to deliver the core attribute of democratic 
governance, which we take to be public control with political equality. 
(Beetham and Lord 2001, p. 458). 
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 5 Conclusions 
Nationalism laid a foundation for modern democracy by defining the demos 
in terms of a nation, which in turn was to coincide with the state. The demos 
of modern democratic practise thus became territorially bound. If we 
envisage the future of Europe as negotiation and power sharing between 
territorial states and non territorial entities, this seemingly firm foundation 
begins to crumble (Jönsson et al 2000, p. 177). 
 
The thesis started with general queries about the nature of the European 
Parliament, the principal relation to national parliaments and representation in 
Europe. Since European Integration is characterised by complexity and constant 
transformation, the question of democracy in the EU involves both fundamental 
questions on the nature of politics and society, as well as the nature of European 
Integration. As a way to formulate clear-cut alternatives and to map out possible 
roles for the European Parliament four scenarios for European Integration, 
developed by Jönsson (2007) et al was chosen as a framework for the analysis. 
The scenarios are named as follows: Europe of States, United States of Europe, 
Europe of Regions and Europe of Networks. 
Two different models of democracy, based on a representative and 
deliberative ideal respectively, were chosen to analyse what possibilities and 
challenges with regard to democracy each scenario poses. Lord’s democratic 
model has traits of consociational democracy developed by Arend Lijphart, as an 
attempt to make a representative model fit the multinational EU context. The core 
definition of democracy from which Lord carries out the audit is public control 
with political equality.  Eriksen and Fossum use deliberative democratic theory as 
a yardstick when developing their account on democracy in the EU. In a working 
paper they construct three sub models for European Integration as a means to 
regain democratic legitimacy, which has some similarities to the scenarios 
presented. Eriksen and Fossum’s two basic conditions for a democratic order are: 
authoritative institutions equipped with an organised capacity to make binding 
decisions and allocate values, and a common communicative space located in 
civil society, where the citizens can jointly form opinions and put power holders to 
account (Eriksen and Fossum 2007, p.8). 
The combination of scenarios and democratic theory, gives the possibility to 
specify the initial queries into the following research questions: 
 
• What is the principal relation between EP and national parliaments (or 
equivalent institutions) in each scenario? 
• What are the challenges and possibilities for the EP as a representative 
institution? What challenges do the four scenarios pose in relation to 
models of representative and deliberative democracy? 
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 An important conclusion about the democratic theories used, is that despite their 
different starting points they converge on some fundamental issues. Firstly they 
both view representative institutions, as an important part of any future European 
polity. Lord does so in a direct way, basing his model on representative 
democracy. By contrast, Eriksen and Fossum do so indirectly, stating that due to 
the complexity and scale of modern society representative institutions is 
necessary. Secondly, they both stress  — albeit to different extent — the 
importance of public deliberation. For Lord, public deliberation is inherent in the 
parliamentary system. As a part of political equality, members of a democracy 
must be able to deliberate what they propose to do in common in a way that 
abstracts from power relations. Moreover, the act of voting is more likely to be 
acceptable to the losing side if accompanied by discussion, consultation and 
persuasion (Lord, 2004a, p. 24). Eriksen and Fossum have a similar view, stating 
that representative democracy relies on deliberation to produce cogent results. 
More emphasis is, however put on the deliberations in the public sphere. 
Decisions taken not only have to reflect the preferences and priorities of the 
electorate, more importantly, to reflect the continuing process of justification 
existing to the civil sphere. 
What happens when the models are applied on the scenarios? None of the 
models fits very well with the democratic theories. In the Europe of States 
scenario, integration is rolled back, the ultimate decision making power is in the 
hands of the Member States’ governments and the EP has a role of audit agent, in 
contrast to a representative institution. The deliberative qualities of 
intergovernmental conference can be questioned in line with Eriksen and 
Fossum’s demands for a public sphere. A further doubt can be expressed 
regarding the risk of rolling back European Integration causing procedural 
accountability, as opposed to a substantial one. From Lord’s model the issue of 
representation presents a stumbling block. Depending on the levels of economical 
and social integration in Europe, other identities than the national one might not 
be represented. 
In United States of Europe the EU has developed into a federation. With the 
EP as a federal parliament with full legislative power, the relation between the EP 
and national parliaments is defined in a constitution. The principal objection from 
Eriksen and Fossum’s model would be that this scenario requires the Union to be 
institutionally equipped to claim direct legitimation and the European institutions 
(including the EP) must be able to sustain processes of identity-building. With 
regard to Lord’s democratic model, and the different forms of representation, one 
objection can be raised on whether a federal design would fit the social cleavages 
in Europe (in line with the consociational feature of Lord’s model). If citizens feel 
more attached to their nation states, or regions a mismatch would occur. The risk 
is that the deliberation might be too fragmented to be aggregated into a single 
public space at the European level. 
Europe of Regions, implies an order in which regions are the driving force of 
European Integration, as the state has lost its leading role and the EU has neither 
an intergovernmental nor a supranational form of organisation. A multitude of 
organisational forms is conceivable, the question is if the regions will replicate the 
 40
 nation state institutions or whether new forms of organisation will develop. The 
objection from Eriksen and Fossum’s model is how a system of authoritative 
institutions equipped with an organised capacity to make binding decisions might 
be achieved within a regional framework and if a common communicative space 
can develop, given the diversity of the regions today. If the Regions organise 
themselves into representative institutions, the possibility of a European 
Parliament consisting of representatives from regions would not constitute a 
problem. Since both are territorial forms of organisation, a parliament of regions 
could functions to a similar fashion as parliament of nation states. From Lord’s 
model the principal objection would be to what extent regional representation 
adequately delivers representative democracy. 
The last of the four scenarios represents a Europe of Networks. This scenario 
implies territory is no longer the main organisational base.  Instead of being 
organised through geographical levels—regional, supranational, etc.—, decisions 
are made within informal, policy-based transgressing networks, with participants 
from different levels. It poses a challenge to the parliamentary model, while 
promising the possibility of meeting the fundamental problem of needs and 
interests of citizens crosscutting national and regional territorial divisions. 
With regard to Eriksen and Fossum, a particularly tricky issue for non-state 
based entities is how to ensure democratic ideals of congruence and 
accountability. The solution for the assurance of accountability is that the EU 
handles a limited range of functions on which it has final authority, within a 
system of certain fundamental legal guarantees. When it comes to congruence, it 
possesses a different status since it cannot simply refer back to a delimited 
democratic constituency, but must always balance the requirements of certain 
constituency with the: “universal principles embedded in cosmopolitan law”. Civil 
society and the public sphere will therefore have a central role in demanding and 
ensuring proper justificatory accounts. The question is what role representative 
institutions will have. A European Parliament without decision making 
capabilities, could however not function as a link between the opinion formation 
in the public sphere and will formation the decision making, as suggested by 
Eriksen and Fossum’s model. 
Lord’s model fits poorly with networks, as Network governance is difficult to 
combine with the tenets of the model: public control and political equality. The 
problem includes: how to achieve transparency and publicity, fairness and 
equality within the networks, how to reach decisions and the perhaps greatest 
difficulty, how to decide on legitimate stakeholders (i.e. access to policy making 
networks). Network governance upsets the basic feature of a representative model, 
namely that elected, representative bodies take decisions that neutral 
bureaucracies executes and network governance is therefore difficult to combine 
with Lord’s model. 
From the conducted study some concluding remarks can be made. The 
analysis has demonstrated classic questions about representation and 
accountability are valid in the context democracy of the EU (and perhaps have 
experienced a renaissance?). The scenarios have provided the conceptual 
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 background to explore the nature of the EP, and its role in different settings of 
European Integration. 
A general difficulty, in all scenarios is how to combine territorial and non-
territorial forms of organisations. Even though Eriksen and Fossum state their 
deliberative model it does not presuppose nation state, it still has great difficulties 
in conceiving a democratic design, not dependent on the representative structures 
of the nation state. Different forms identity (regional, national or ‘European’) is a 
key aspect for the feasibility of the model in all scenarios.  
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 6 Executive Summary 
The European Parliament has been said to be the institution: “most commonly and 
most interestingly associated with the EU’s democracy problem”. The overall 
topic this thesis seeks to explore is the institutional role of the European 
Parliament (EP) and representation in the EU.  
Students of the EU today tend to agree that the Union represents a political 
order that is neither an intergovernmental organisation nor a supranational state, a 
political form “hard to catch within available theoretical nets”. Some reasons for 
this are the fluidity and complexity, as well as the constant transformations that 
are characteristic of European Integration, where an important aspect is the 
tension between territorial and non-territorial forms of organisation, which is 
inherent in the European project. On the one hand, the EU is a union between 
national states, whilst on the other, policy making within the union is to a high 
degree, organised around networks that include actors other than the official 
representatives of the Member States.  
The above-described characteristics and the problem of finding an accurate 
description of the EU create difficulties for the study of democracy in the EU. In 
this thesis four scenarios describing European Integration have been used to 
formulate clear-cut alternatives and to map out possible roles for the European 
Parliament. The scenarios represent four possible lines of development for 
Europe, capturing important aspects of European Integration. The respective 
scenarios are as follows: Europe of States, United States of Europe, Europe of 
Regions and Europe of Networks. 
In the Europe of States, the EU functions as a traditional multilateral 
organisation. The EU has retracted much of its influence, the level of 
supranational influence is minimal and the Member States governments are in 
control. Untied States of Europe implies the current Member States are 
transformed into units of a federation, with clearly defined competences and sets 
of powers in relation to the central (federal) government. With Europe of Regions, 
the state has lost its leading role and the EU has neither an intergovernmental nor 
a supranational form of organisation; instead, regions are the main unit of 
organisation. Here a region is defined as a unit smaller than an ordinary national 
state but larger than a municipality. Simply put, it is an entity between the national 
and the local. Europe of Networks implies territory is no longer the main base for 
the organisation of societies.  Instead of being organised through geographical 
levels-regional, supranational, etc.-, decisions are being made within informal, 
policy-based transgressing networks, with participants from different levels. 
Network development is driven by a segmentation of political power where each 
policy area demands a certain expertise and can be seen as a continuation of the 
ongoing process in the EU for the last decades 
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 Furthermore two different models of democracy, based on a representative and 
deliberative ideal respectively, are employed to analyse the role of EP in each 
scenario. Combining scenarios and democratic theories following research 
questions is asked:  
 
• What is the principal relation between the EP and national parliaments (or 
equivalent institutions) in each scenario? 
 
• What are the challenges and possibilities for the EP as a representative 
institution? What challenges do the four scenarios pose in relation to 
models of representative and deliberative democracy? 
 
Deliberative democracy can be described as a mode of thinking that seeks to 
reconstruct democracy as governance based upon the public use of reason. A 
basic tenet is that democratic legitimacy requires public justification of political 
decisions to those who are affected by them. This is guaranteed through the 
concepts of congruence and accountability. Congruence holds that those affected 
by laws also should be authorised to make them. Accountability refers to a 
justificatory process wherein decision-makers can be held responsible to the 
citizenry, and in the last resort it is possible to dismiss incompetent rulers. 
According to Eriksen and Fossum, representative democracy relies on 
deliberation to produce cogent results. The main argument for deliberative 
democracy is a free and open discourse brings forth qualitatively better decisions, 
which are justified to the affected parties. Public discourse and criticism together 
with party-competition and periodic election are the best ways for realising 
popular sovereignty. The public sphere located in civil society holds a unique 
position in deliberative theory, this is where everyone has the opportunity to 
participate in the discussion of how common affairs should be handled and where 
decision-makers can be held accountable.  
The representative theories original use was as a part of an audit of democracy 
in the EU. The core definition for this democratic model is public control with 
political equality. From this core value a number of mediating values emanate: 
authorisation, participation, responsiveness, representation, transparency, 
accountability and solidarity. Two sets of tests for determining the level of 
democracy in the EU forms the backbone of the model. The first seeks to test 
whether EU can be controlled by national democracies. The second adds the 
requirement that representatives of national democracies should not only reach a 
high level of consensus between themselves, but also with those elected for the 
express purpose of representing the public in Union institutions. By definition, 
however, this requires consensus between two representative bodies.  
An important conclusion about the democratic theories used, is that despite 
their differing staring points they converge on some fundamental issues. Firstly 
they both view representative institutions, as an important part of any future 
European polity. Lord in a direct way as he bases his model on representative 
democracy, and Eriksen and Fossum indirectly, as they state that due to the 
complexity and scale of modern society representative institutions are necessary. 
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 Secondly, they both stress, albeit to different extent the importance of public 
deliberation. For Lord public deliberation is inherent in the parliamentary system. 
As a part of political equality, members of a democracy must be able to deliberate 
what they propose to do in common in a way that abstracts from power relations. 
Moreover the act of voting is more likely to be acceptable to the losing side if 
accompanied by discussion, consultation and persuasion. Eriksen and Fossum 
have a similar view, whereby representative democracy relies on deliberation to 
produce cogent result. Stronger emphasis, however, is put on the deliberations in 
the public sphere. Decisions taken not only have to reflect the preferences and 
priorities of the electorate, but more importantly, also reflect the continuing 
process of justification existing civil sphere. 
 In the scenario Europe of States, European Integration is rolled back and the 
ultimate decision making power is in the hands Member States governments and 
the EP has the role of audit agent, in contrast to a representative institution. The 
deliberative qualities of intergovernmental conference can be questioned in line 
with demand for a public sphere. Rolling back European Integration also faces the 
risk of causing procedural accountability, as opposed to substantial one, which is a 
requirement in Eriksen and Fossum’s model. From Lords model the issue of 
representation presents a stumbling block. Depending levels of economical and 
social integration in Europe, other identities than the national one might not be 
represented. 
In United States of Europe the EU develops into a federation, with the EP as a 
federal parliament with full legislative powers. The relation between the EP and 
national parliaments is defined in a constitution. The principal objection from 
Eriksen and Fossum’s model would be that this scenario requires the Union to be 
institutionally equipped to claim direct legitimation and the European institutions 
(including the EP) must be able to sustain processes of identity-building. With 
regard to Lord’s democratic model, and the different forms of representation, one 
objection can be raised whether a federal design would fit the social cleavages in 
Europe (in line with the consociational feature of Lord’s model). If citizens feel 
more attached to their nation states, or regions a mismatch would occur. The risk 
is that the deliberation might be too fragmented to be aggregated into a single 
public space at the European level. 
Europe of Regions, implies an order where regions are the driving force of 
European Integration, since the state looses its leading role and the EU has neither 
an intergovernmental nor a supranational form of organisation. A multitude of 
organisational forms are conceivable, the questions is whether the regions will 
replicate the nation state institutions or if new forms will develop. The objection 
from Eriksen and Fossum’s model is how a system of authoritative institutions 
equipped with an organised capacity to make binding decisions can be achieved 
within a regional framework and whether a common communicative space can 
develop, given the diversity of the Regions today. If the Regions organise 
themselves in representative institutions, the possibility of a European Parliament 
consisting of representatives from regions would not constitute a problem. As 
both are territorial forms of organisation, a parliament of regions could function in 
a similar fashion as parliament of nation states. From Lords model the principal 
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 objection would be to what extent regional representation adequately delivers 
representative democracy. 
The last of the four scenarios represents a Europe of Networks. This scenario 
implies the principle of territory is no longer the main basis for societal 
organisation.  Instead of being organised through geographical levels—regional, 
supranational, etc.—, decisions are being made within informal, policy-based 
transgressing networks, with participants from different levels. It poses a 
challenge to the parliamentary model, while promising the possibility of meeting 
the fundamental problem of needs and interests of citizens crosscutting national 
and regional territorial divisions. As theoretically driven discussion demonstrates, 
the question of access is a defining feature of a network. 
With regard to Eriksen and Fossum, a particularly tricky issue for non-state 
based entities is how to ensure democratic ideals of congruence and 
accountability. The answer for the assurance of accountability is that the EU 
handles a limited range of functions in which it has final authority, within a 
system of certain fundamental legal guarantees. When it comes to congruence, it 
possesses a different status since it cannot simply refer back to a delimited 
democratic constituency, but must always balance the requirements of certain 
constituency with the: “universal principles embedded in cosmopolitan law”. Civil 
society and the public sphere will therefore have a central role in demanding and 
ensuring proper justificatory accounts. The question is what role representative 
institutions will have. A European Parliament without decision making 
capabilities, could however not function as a link between the opinion formation 
in the public sphere and will formation the decision making, as suggested by 
Eriksen and Fossum’s model. 
Lord’s model fits poorly with networks. Network governance is hard to 
combine with the tenets of the model: public control and political equality. The 
problem includes: how to achieve transparency and publicity, fairness and 
equality within the networks, how to reach decisions and the greatest difficulty, 
how to decide the legitimate stakeholders (i.e. access to policy making networks). 
Network governance upsets the basic feature of a representative model, namely 
that elected, representative bodies take decisions that neutral bureaucracy executes 
and network governance. Therefore network governance proves difficult to 
combinw with Lord’s model. 
From the conducted study some concluding remarks can be made. The 
analysis has demonstrated classic questions about representation and 
accountability is valid in the context democracy in the EU. The scenarios have 
provided the conceptual background to explore the nature of the EP, and as its 
role in different settings of European Integration.A general difficulty, in all 
scenarios is how to combine territorial and non-territorial forms of organisations. 
Even though Fossum and Eriksen state their deliberative model it does not 
presuppose nation state, it still has great difficulties in conceiving a democratic 
design, not dependent on the representative structures of the nation state. Different 
forms of identity (regional, national or ‘European’) is a key aspect for the 
feasibility of the model in all scenarios. 
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